43. IoT and OT Security – Cameras, Smart Devices, Plant Networks
Chala mitrano, Chapter 42 madhe IDS, firewall ani honeypot baghitla – aata IoT (Internet of Things – smart cameras, sensors, meters) ani OT (Operational Technology – plant / warehouse control, PLC, SCADA). CEH exam modules madhe IoT topic yeto, pan aapan he shikto defence-first: default password, open MQTT, IT–OT mix-up – kasa Blue harden karto. Ghabru naka – OWN host-only lab (Kali 192.168.56.10, Metasploitable 192.168.56.20, optional IoT target 192.168.56.50). Production plant / neighbour chi camera never. Lakshat theva: IT tools (aggressive scan, random reboot) OT madhe safety (सुरक्षा) todu shaktat – pehle isolation, mag test.
What you will learn in this chapter
- IoT vs OT / ICS / SCADA – CIA plus safety; why casual IT tools can hurt plants
- Attack surface: default creds, Telnet/HTTP, UPnP, exposed dashboards – Blue hardening
- Protocol awareness: MQTT, CoAP, Modbus/DNP3 concepts (no weaponized OT recipes)
- Mirai-class botnets – weak IoT, outbound C2, ISP/SME lessons
- Network segregation – IT/OT zones, jump hosts, firewalld allow-lists
- Internet-exposure awareness (search YOUR OWN lab IPs only; never scan strangers)
- Firmware / update / supply-chain hygiene for cameras and PLCs (concepts)
- Detection: odd outbound from IoT VLAN, failed logins, protocol anomalies
- Lab: Mosquitto MQTT or simple "camera" web UI on OWN Amazon Linux / Ubuntu VM
- Project Build-Hack-Fix for Sahyadri Traders + ethics / IT Act + purple interview lines
Lab scope
Practice only against systems you own in host-only / isolated lab (Kali 192.168.56.10, Metasploitable 192.168.56.20, optional IoT / MQTT / fake-camera VM e.g. 192.168.56.50). Never scan a neighbour's camera, shop DVR, factory PLC, or random public IP "to see if Mirai hits". Never publish Modbus write-attack runbooks, never flash unknown firmware on a live packing line, never use internet-search engines to mass-map strangers' devices. IT Act sections such as 43 and 66 apply if you access others' systems without authority (verify current text). Lab = learn hardening. Production OT = change control + safety review first.
Concepts in this chapter
- 43.1IoT vs OT / ICS / SCADA – CIA Plus Safety
- 43.2Attack Surface – Defaults, Telnet, HTTP, UPnP, Dashboards
- 43.3Protocol Awareness – MQTT, CoAP, Modbus, DNP3
- 43.4Mirai-Class Botnets – Weak IoT, Outbound C2
- 43.5Network Segregation – IT / OT Zones, Jump Hosts, firewalld
- 43.6Internet Exposure Awareness – Your Lab Only
- 43.7Firmware, Updates and Supply-Chain Hygiene
- 43.8Detection – Outbound IoT, Failed Logins, Protocol Oddities
- 43.9Lab – Mosquitto MQTT or Fake Camera UI on OWN VM
- 43.10Project, Ethics, IT Act and Purple Interview Lines
The chapter recap is at the end of the last concept page.
Chapter 43: IoT and OT security — practice tasks
Open chapter lessons · Full guided lab: secure home iot devices guest network (not repeated here)
43.1 Inventory home IoT
EasyITWhy: You can't protect devices you forgot.
What: List every smart device on your home net.
How:
- Check router DHCP client list.
- Note name, IP, vendor.
Expected output: A table of ≥3 devices.
Hint
Cameras and bulbs count.
Answer / how to check
- Every DHCP client identified or marked unknown.
43.2 Put IoT on a guest/VLAN
MediumRetailWhy: A hacked camera should not reach your laptop.
What: Move devices to guest Wi-Fi or IoT VLAN.
How:
- Enable guest/IoT SSID.
- Rejoin camera/bulb there.
- From laptop on main LAN, try to browse camera IP.
Expected output: Camera works in app; laptop cannot reach admin page (or limited).
Hint
See linked IoT lab.
Answer / how to check
- Segment confirmed.
43.3 Default password hunt (paper)
EasyLogisticsWhy: Factories still ship default passwords.
What: Mark each device habit Safe or Fix.
Data file: iot.csv
| Device | Password habit |
|---|---|
| Warehouse camera | admin/admin |
| Door sensor | random 16-char |
| PLC (air-gapped) | local only, no internet |
About this file: Made-up OT/IoT habits. Each row is one device. Columns: Device; Password habit.
How:
- Read the data file.
Expected output: Default admin/admin Fix; unique password Safe; no internet exposure Safe.
Hint
Change defaults before connecting online.
Answer / how to check
- At least one Fix.
Extended teaching notes
Why this lesson matters
Cameras, sensors and plant controllers often ship with weak defaults. Segment them from IT, change passwords, block inbound internet, and watch outbound traffic.
Real examples
Global: Mirai showed what default passwords on routers/cameras can do at scale. Indian SME (sample): a factory puts PLCs on a separate VLAN reachable only via a jump host.
Mini case study
Suppose we are on a purple-team exercise for an Indian mid-size company (sample data). Red notes a technique from this lesson against a lab clone. Blue must show the control that stops it, the log that would have fired, and the ticket that hardens production. That is the standard this course trains you for.
Defender's worksheet (do this today)
- Write the lesson title, date and the exact lab target you are allowed to use.
- List three owned systems (VMs, apps, or cloud accounts) where this lesson applies.
- Run one safe check from the lesson on a lab system only. Paste the command and output.
- Write a two-sentence fix you would give a teammate.
- Name one related public advisory (CERT-In, CISA, NVD, or a vendor bulletin) with its date.
Indian workplace (sample data)
Suppose we are a junior analyst at Infosys, TCS, Wipro or a fintech SOC in Bengaluru/Pune. Turn this lesson into one checklist item with an owner, a due date and a place to store evidence (ticket + screenshot).
Global practice
Compare your notes with OWASP, CIS Benchmarks, NIST CSF/IR guidance or a cloud Well-Architected security question. Write five lines on what overlaps.
Everyday analogy
Explain the risk and the fix to a family member without jargon. If they can repeat the warning, you understand it well enough to teach juniors.
Key terms
- Control: a safeguard (patch, config, process, detection).
- Finding: a weakness backed by evidence.
- Remediation: the fix plus how you verified it.
- Scope: systems you have written permission to touch.
- Least privilege: only the access the task needs.
- Defence in depth: several layers so one failure does not end the story.
Common mistakes
- Skipping written permission "just for a quick scan".
- Practising on hostel, office or public targets without authorisation.
- Collecting tool output without writing the fix.
- Copying attack steps onto production to "verify". Defenders verify with versions, configs and patches.
- Publishing screenshots that contain secrets, cookies or internal hostnames.
Recap
- Evidence, fix, owner, date.
- Own lab only.
- Fix > spectacle.