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38. Active Directory Attacks and Defence

38.7 Privilege Escalation Paths and Domain Admin Risks

Common AD privilege escalation (अधिकार वाढ) themes (concepts):

  • ACL abuse: GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner on users/groups/computers
  • Shadow admins / nested group surprises
  • Unconstrained delegation on a computer – stolen TGTs risk if that host is compromised (prefer constrained / resource-based constrained delegation)
  • Over-privileged service accounts that are also in high groups
  • Legacy protocols + mis-set SPNs (38.4)

Domain Admin risk: backup operators, account operators, DNS admins (historically sensitive), replication rights (DCSync) – treat as Tier-0 adjacent. Remediation: clean nested groups; JIT/PAM; PAW; no standing DA for daily mail; audit privileged groups weekly.

Red team (attacker) does Blue team (defender) detects / stops
Walks ACL edges until reset-password / group add on DA Regular ACL / BloodHound reviews; remove WriteDacl/GenericAll sprawl
Targets unconstrained delegation hosts Inventory TrustedForDelegation; migrate to constrained/RBCD; monitor
Adds self to privileged group after ACL abuse Alert 4728/4732 on Domain Admins; webhook to SOC

Ravindra Bagale's Tip

"Domain Admin as the daily driver" – the most common mistake in Maharashtra SMBs (fictional shops too). Even if Raja is the business owner – no daily Chrome sessions as DA. Use a separate admin account + the PAW habit. For interviews, keep a one-liner ready on unconstrained vs constrained delegation.

Lab

Lab DC var PowerShell (as lab admin): list users with SPN; list computers TrustedForDelegation. Document findings. Create intentional bad ACL on a test OU (GenericAll to amir) → BloodHound shows edge → remove ACL → re-verify. Never leave bad ACL overnight without snapshot restore plan.

Extended teaching notes

Why this lesson matters

Active Directory is the identity plane for many Indian enterprises. Attack path tools exist so defenders can remove dangerous edges: excessive admin rights, unconstrained delegation, stale accounts.

  • Tiered admin model; no daily Domain Admin use.
  • LAPS for local admin passwords.
  • Monitor for unusual Kerberos / replication behaviour.
  • Lab AD only — never against a corporate domain without a signed engagement.

Mini case study

Suppose we are on a purple-team exercise for an Indian mid-size company (sample data). Red notes a technique from this lesson against a lab clone. Blue must show the control that stops it, the log that would have fired, and the ticket that hardens production. That is the standard this course trains you for.

Defender's worksheet (do this today)

  1. Write the lesson title, date and the exact lab target you are allowed to use.
  2. List three owned systems (VMs, apps, or cloud accounts) where this lesson applies.
  3. Run one safe check from the lesson on a lab system only. Paste the command and output.
  4. Write a two-sentence fix you would give a teammate.
  5. Name one related public advisory (CERT-In, CISA, NVD, or a vendor bulletin) with its date.

Indian workplace (sample data)

Suppose we are a junior analyst at Infosys, TCS, Wipro or a fintech SOC in Bengaluru/Pune. Turn this lesson into one checklist item with an owner, a due date and a place to store evidence (ticket + screenshot).

Global practice

Compare your notes with OWASP, CIS Benchmarks, NIST CSF/IR guidance or a cloud Well-Architected security question. Write five lines on what overlaps.

Everyday analogy

Explain the risk and the fix to a family member without jargon. If they can repeat the warning, you understand it well enough to teach juniors.

Key terms

  • Control: a safeguard (patch, config, process, detection).
  • Finding: a weakness backed by evidence.
  • Remediation: the fix plus how you verified it.
  • Scope: systems you have written permission to touch.
  • Least privilege: only the access the task needs.
  • Defence in depth: several layers so one failure does not end the story.

Common mistakes

  • Skipping written permission "just for a quick scan".
  • Practising on hostel, office or public targets without authorisation.
  • Collecting tool output without writing the fix.
  • Copying attack steps onto production to "verify". Defenders verify with versions, configs and patches.
  • Publishing screenshots that contain secrets, cookies or internal hostnames.

Recap

  • Evidence, fix, owner, date.
  • Own lab only.
  • Fix > spectacle.